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MEASURED ENDORSEMENT
SHARI SEIDMAN DIAMOND* & ANDREW KOPPELMAN**
INTRODUCTION
It would be appalling to conduct litigation under the Estab-
lishment Clause as if it were a trademark case, with experts
testifying about whether one display is really like another,
and witnesses testifying that they were offended-but would
have been less so were the creche five feet closer to the
jumbo candy cane.'
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment is in flux. For many years, there was no unified Establish-
ment Clause doctrine, but only a series of disconnected results. The
Court finally converged on a single standard in 1971, when it held in
Lemon v. Kurtzman2 that in order to withstand an Establishment Clause
challenge, "[f] irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion.'"" In subsequent
years, however, this standard proved amorphous and unpredictable in
its application, and produced confusing results. "Critics commonly in-
tone what has become an almost canonized litany of paired but mani-
festly inconsistent decisions purporting to apply the test."4 The future
of the Lemon test is doubtful. "[A] majority of the Justices on the cur-
rent Court have expressed dissatisfaction with the test and have advo-
cated alternatives .. .
* Professor of Law and Psychology, Northwestern University, and Senior Research
Fellow, American Bar Foundation. B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., University of Chi-
cago; M.A., Ph.D., Northwestern University.
** Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern University. A.B.,
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1. Am. Jewish Cong. v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 130 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting), quoted with approval in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 676 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a critical assessment of these
claims, see infra note 186.
2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3. Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664,
674 (1970)).
4. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality
and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 266, 269 (1987).
5. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 987 (1997).
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Among the various proposals for reform, the one that appears to
have the broadest support on the Supreme Court is the "no endorse-
ment" test advocated by Justice O'Connor. 6 That test holds that gov-
ernment violates the Establishment Clause when it acts in a way that
endorses religion.7 A number of majority opinions of the Court have
adopted the "no endorsement" test, and in some cases without a ma-
jority opinion, a majority of the justices adopted the test.8
6. See generally Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997); Westside Cmty. Bd. of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250-53 (1990).
7. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-93 (1989) ("The Establish-
ment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to
a person's standing in the political community."' (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
8. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305-08 (2000) (applying
the "no endorsement" test); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 395 (1993) (same); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-53, 263 (writing for the plurality,
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Blackmun,
applied the "no endorsement" test); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 600-01 (applying the
"no endorsement" test); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987) (same); Witters v.
Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986) (same); Grand Rapids Sch.
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-97 (1985) (same); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985)
(applying the test within the first step of the Lemon test and explaining that if endorsement
is found to be the purpose of a statute, there is no need to apply the second and third steps
of the Lemon test).
In Capitol Square Review &Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (plurality opin-
ion), all nine of the now-sitting Justices wrote or signed opinions indicating that endorse-
ment was at least relevant to Establishment Clause analysis. See id. at 763-69 (plurality
opinion) (Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, emphasizing that "endorsement" only occurs when the government itself either
expresses religious values or discriminates by showing favoritism to private religious activi-
ties); id. at 774 (Justice O'Connor, concurring, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer) (dis-
agreeing with the plurality's attempt to limit the application of the endorsement test and
asserting that "an impermissible message of endorsement can be sent in a variety of con-
texts, not all of which involve direct government speech or outright favoritism"); id. at 799
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If a reasonable person could perceive a government endorse-
ment of religion from a private display, then the State may not allow its property to be used
as a forum for that display."); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (indicating that en-
dorsement is relevant to Establishment Clause analysis).
At the same time, the test has fallen short of full adoption by the Court. Professor
Smith's conclusion twelve years ago remains an accurate description of the Court's
position:
The Court seems disposed to accept the expansive implications of the test, and
thus to employ "endorsement" as an additional ground for finding an impermissi-
ble purpose or effect in a challenged law. However, the Court has not yet ac-
cepted the restrictive implications of the test; it has not confirmed, for instance,
that a law which does not endorse religion may be upheld even if "it in fact
causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion."
Smith, supra note 4, at 275 (footnote omitted) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). As we shall make clear below, we think that this restriction of
the test's scope is appropriate. We think that the endorsement test is an appropriate ele-
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The Court's adoption of the test, however, conceals a mass of
continuing uncertainty. Two ambiguities are especially salient. First,
it is not clear that the way the test has in fact been applied is consistent
with its rationale. Second, the Court has not offered much guidance
as to how to address disagreement over whether any particular govern-
ment action is an endorsement of religion.
In this Article, we shall offer a solution to both of these problems.
We will argue that the prohibition of endorsement is an indispensable
element of the Establishment Clause. And we will further argue that
this prohibition can be operationalized with less confusion and uncer-
tainty than the Court's opinions suggest. The basic problem with the
Court's approach is that none of the Justices appears to have noticed
that the problem of plural interpretations of symbols is not unique to
Establishment Clause litigation. It arises in other areas of the law in-
volving symbolic communication. Of these, the area with the best de-
veloped standards for discerning whether a forbidden message has
been communicated to the public is trademark law.
When a litigant claims trademark infringement under the Lan-
ham Act,9 courts frequently use survey evidence to assist in determin-
ing whether consumers are likely to be confused about the source of a
particular product. 1 Similarly, when a litigant claims that a competi-
ment of the Establishment Clause doctrine, but we do not think it should swallow the
entire doctrine.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et. seq. (1994). The Lanham Act provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, char-
acteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1).
10. See, e.g., Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 475
(3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that the survey is the most direct form of evidence that can be
offered on likelihood of confusion); Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur,
Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 669 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting the use of survey results by a cosmetics
company as partial evidence of trademark law violations); Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen.
Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 665 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that the litigants failed to show
consumer confusion because the only evidence shown to support their claim was a con-
sumer survey that failed to establish the likelihood of actual confusion); Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., No. CV-90-1183HLH, 1991 Dist. LEXIS 21172, at *14-15 (C.D. Cal.,
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tor has engaged in deceptive advertising," litigants often present sur-
vey evidence to assist the court in assessing whether consumers are
likely to be deceived by the commercial message.12 Applying an anal-
ogous empirical approach to test for violations of the Establishment
Clause, we show that courts need not speculate about the reactions of
the community or rely solely on their own potentially idiosyncratic
perspectives in evaluating whether the government is creating a per-
ception of religious endorsement. Rather, in cases involving allega-
tions that the Establishment Clause has been violated, a systematic
assessment of reactions from members of the community to the dis-
play or symbol at issue can assist courts in determining whether the
particular display conveys a message of religious endorsement. As in
Lanham Act cases, the value of the empirical evidence that a survey
can supply is determined by an evaluation of whether the survey was
conducted on a relevant population; applied appropriate sampling
techniques; employed an unbiased testing approach, including the
use of suitable stimulus materials, research design, and questions; and
analyzed and reported the results thoroughly and objectively.
We begin by describing the confused state of the endorsement
test. Then we offer our revision. We then describe the central role
occupied by the assessment of likely consumer reaction in cases alleg-
ing trademark infringement and in cases alleging violations of the Es-
tablishment Clause. We next describe how survey evidence is used in
a typical Lanham Act case and show how a similar approach can be
applied when the question is whether a particular display or symbol
conveys a message of religious endorsement by the government. In
addition to offering a new method for assessing whether a violation of
the Establishment Clause has occurred, our discussion of the empiri-
cal model we propose to apply to Establishment Clause cases provides
a further benefit-it makes explicit some questions that evolving legal
doctrine on the Establishment Clause has addressed inconsistently,
and that have, as a result, produced uncertainty about the legal stan-
dard that is applicable in Establishment Clause cases. We suggest sev-
eral ways of resolving the ambiguity of the perspective of the
Sept. 3, 1991), affd in part &rev'd on other grounds, 13 F.3d 1297, rev'd, 514 U.S. 159 (1995)
(finding that surveys are relevant evidence on the issue of likelihood of confusion).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
12. See, e.g., Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir.
1997) ("Reactions of the public are typically tested through the use of consumer surveys.");
FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (accepting
the "general desirability of having some empirical evidence of consumer perception" in
deceptive advertising cases, and noting that such evidence may include consumer survey
data).
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"objective observer" that Justice O'Connor suggested as the relevant
basis for a workable endorsement test.13 We also identify and address
unresolved issues about the appropriate weight to be given to the per-
ceptions of majority and minority community members in evaluating
whether a message of endorsement has been conveyed.
We emphasize the limited nature of our claim. We are not saying
that survey evidence must be relied on in all Establishment Clause
cases involving religious displays.14 In many cases, the presence or
absence of religious meaning in the display and the nature of that
meaning will be clear enough that such evidence will be unnecessary.
We are saying that evidence from an appropriately conducted survey is
always relevant and should be per se admissible in any such case.
I. THE CONFUSED ENDORSEMENT TEST
A. The Doctrine as Justice O'Connor Has Formulated It
Justice O'Connor first proposed the endorsement test in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 5 a case considering the constitutionality of a city's Christmas
nativity display.16 The display, erected by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode
Island, was located in a park, owned by a nonprofit organization, that
was located in the middle of the city's shopping district.17 In addition
to the creche, the display included a Santa Claus house; reindeer pull-
ing Santa's sleigh; candy-striped poles; a Christmas tree; carolers; cut-
out figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and
a teddy bear; hundreds of colored lights; and a large banner bearing
13. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding the relevant en-
dorsement issue to be "whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement");
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'ConnorJ, concurring) ("The meaning of
a statement to its audience depends both on the intention of the speaker and on the
objective' meaning of the statement in the community.").
14. Much less are we claiming, as Jamin Raskin asserts, that adjudication of Establish-
ment Clause claims "ultimately turns... on the subjective perceptions of either a majority
or minority faction within the population," or that we wish to "assign the task of constitu-
tional adjudication to the audience." Jamin Raskin, Polling Establishment: Judicial Review,
Democracy, and the Endorsement Theory of the Establishment Clause-Commentary on Measured
Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REv. 761, 762, 776 (2001). No one, to our knowledge, has ever
propounded such a claim, but if anyone were to do so, we would join Raskin in rejecting it.
Many of his arguments are predicated on these mischaracterizations of our position. We
will not respond to these arguments, because we are not interested in defending views that
are not ours.
15. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
16. Id. at 670-71.
17. Id. at 671.
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the words "SEASONS GREETINGS."'" The Court, citing the Lemon
test, approved the use of the display. 9
Justice O'Connor joined in the majority opinion, but wrote a sep-
arate opinion proposing a "clarification" of the Lemon test.2" She pro-
posed that the "secular purpose" requirement of Lemon be understood
to mean that government may not act with the intent of endorsing or
disapproving of religion.21 The requirement of a primarily secular ef-
fect would mean that government practices may not create a percep-
tion that government is endorsing or disapproving of religion.
Justice O'Connor justified her new test as following from the pur-
pose, as she understood it, of the Establishment Clause: "The Estab-
lishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political com-
munity. '' 22 One way that government may run afoul of that prohibi-
tion is by endorsement or disapproval of religion. "Endorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message
to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community. Disapproval sends the opposite message."23
The issue in the instant case, Justice O'Connor thought, was
"whether Pawtucket has endorsed Christianity by its display of the
creche." '24 The answer depended on "both what Pawtucket intended
to communicate in displaying the creche and what message the city's
display actually conveyed. '25 Justice O'Connor explained:
The meaning of a statement to its audience depends
both on the intention of the speaker and on the "objective"
meaning of the statement in the community. Some listeners
need not rely solely on the words themselves in discerning
the speaker's intent: they can judge the intent by, for exam-
ple, examining the context of the statement or asking ques-
tions of the speaker. Other listeners do not have or will not
seek access to such evidence of intent. They will rely instead
on the words themselves; for them the message actually con-
veyed may be something not actually intended. If the audi-
18. Id.
19. See id. at 679-87.
20. Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 691.
22. Id. at 687.
23. Id. at 688. This formulation was recently quoted, in part, with approval by the
Court in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000).
24. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25. Id.
[VOL. 60:713
MEASURED ENDORSEMENT
ence is large, as it always is when government "speaks" by
word or deed, some portion of the audience will inevitably
receive a message determined by the "objective" content of
the statement, and some portion will inevitably receive the
intended message. Examination of both the subjective and
the objective components of the message communicated by
a government action is therefore necessary to determine
whether the action carries a forbidden meaning.2 6
With respect to the city's intentions, O'Connor concluded that
"Pawtucket did not intend to convey any message of endorsement of
Christianity or disapproval of non-Christian religions."2 7 The city's
purpose "was not promotion of the religious content of the creche but
celebration of the public holiday through its traditional symbols."28
As for the objective component, "the overall holiday setting changes
what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display-
as a typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious con-
tent of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of
that content. 2
A crucial ambiguity of Justice O'Connor's opinion lay in her fail-
ure to explain whose perceptions she was relying on in order to de-
clare the message of the display. Different people have different
perceptions. Some, but not all, people may perceive endorsement in
any particular case. Her test's rationale seemed to focus on the per-
spective of nonadherents, asking whether they were sent a message
that they were outsiders, but her application of that test did not rely
on their perspective at all. Her discussion of the "objective" compo-
nent of the government message indicated that it mattered what
"some [unspecified] portion of the audience" understood govern-
ment to be saying.30 Her conclusion, though, did not rely on any evi-
dence about how the creche was actually perceived by anyone but
herself." This led some commentators to conclude that she was in
fact viewing the problem from the perspective of a "reasonable Chris-
tian. ' 2 Laurence Tribe has nicely summarized the problem: "When
26. Id.
27. Id. at 691.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 692.
30. Id. at 690.
31. See id. at 694 ("Giving the challenged practice the careful scrutiny it deserves, I
cannot say that the particular crfche display at issue in this case was intended to endorse or
had the effect of endorsing Christianity." (emphasis added)).
32. Norman Dorsen & Charles Sims, The Nativity Scene Case: An Error ofJudgnent, 1985
U. ILL. L. REV. 837, 860 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted with approval in LAU-
RENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1293 (2d ed. 1988).
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deciding whether a state practice makes someone feel like an out-
sider, the result often turns on whether one adopts the perspective of
an outsider or that of an insider. Judges must recognize the range of
possible responses and cannot avoid selecting among them. 33
The question of whose perceptions control was squarely ad-
dressed in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree,34 a
case in which the Court struck down a statute that permitted a mo-
ment of silence for private prayer in public schools.3 5 The majority
opinion relied in part on the endorsement test, concluding that the
law "was intended to convey a message of state approval of prayer ac-
tivities in the public schools. 31 6 O'Connor agreed. This time, how-
ever, she evidently discarded the suggestion in her Lynch concurrence
that the perceptions of real human beings were what mattered for
purposes of determining whether the forbidden endorsement had oc-
curred." Instead, she wrote, "[t] he relevant issue is whether an objec-
tive observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorse-
ment of prayer in public schools."3"
O'Connor thought that the legislative history strongly suggested
that the law was intended to endorse prayer.39 At the time of its enact-
ment, Alabama law already provided for a moment of silence, but the
earlier law did not list voluntary prayer as one of the activities for
which the moment was designated.40 That fact suggested that the sole
purpose of the new law was "to return voluntary prayer to our public
schools."'" On this basis, Justice O'Connor concluded that an objec-
tive observer would perceive a message of endorsement.42
In her opinion in Wallace, Justice O'Connor also made it clear
that the "objective observer" should be understood to be acquainted
with the values of the Free Exercise Clause.43 This qualification is nec-
essary because the Constitution has long been understood to permit,
and sometimes to require, special governmental accommodation of
33. TRIBE, supra note 32, at 1293 (footnote omitted).
34. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
35. Id. at 60-61.
36. Id. at 61.
37. See supra text accompanying note 26.
38. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This formulation was quoted
with approval by the Court in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308
(2000).
39. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 77.
41. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. at 78.
43. Id. at 83.
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religion, such as exemption of Quakers and other religious pacifists
from military duty." An untutored observer might think that such
accommodations represent government endorsement of religion, but
"courts should assume that the 'objective observer' is acquainted with
the Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes."4
Justice O'Connor offered a further clarification of the identity of
the "objective observer" in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v.
Pinette.46 The question in that case was whether the Establishment
Clause forbade Ohio from permitting a private party to display a cross
on the grounds of the state capitol.47 The square where the display
appeared traditionally had been open to the public as a forum for a
variety of views.4 8 Justice Scalia's plurality opinion adopted a per se
rule that "[r]eligious expression cannot violate the Establishment
Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or
designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on
equal terms."49 Justice O'Connor rejected this per se exception to the
endorsement test, arguing that "[a] t some point ... a private religious
group may so dominate a public forum that a formal policy of equal
access is transformed into a demonstration of approval."5 But she
agreed with Justice Scalia that the Establishment Clause was not vio-
lated by the display.5'
Justice Stevens, dissenting, thought the display unconstitutional
because reasonable observers could perceive it as an endorsement of
the message of the cross.5 2 Justice O'Connor, however, rejected the
view "that the endorsement test should focus on the actual perception
of individual observers, who naturally have differing degrees of knowl-
edge."53 The "fundamental difficulty" of relying on actual people is
that "[tihere is always someone who, with a particular quantum of
knowledge, reasonably might perceive a particular action as an en-
dorsement of religion. 54 Rather, "the applicable observer is similar
to the 'reasonable person' in tort law, who 'is not to be identified with
any ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable
44. See infta note 188 (discussing the conscientious objector exemption).
45. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
46. 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (plurality opinion).
47. Id. at 757.
48. Id. at 757-58.
49. Id. at 770.
50. Id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 782.
52. Id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 780.
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things,' but is 'rather a personification of a community ideal of rea-
sonable behavior, determined by the [collective] social judgment."' 55
Thus, she explained, "'we do not ask whether there is any person who
could find an endorsement of religion, whether some people may be
offended by the display, or whether some reasonable person might
think [the State] endorses religion."' 56
In the instant case, "the reasonable observer in the endorsement
inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the com-
munity and forum in which the religious display appears. '57 That con-
text included "the fact that Capitol Square is a public park that has
been used over time by private speakers of various types. "58 The "rea-
sonable observer" would not regard the display as an endorsement of
religion, because that observer "would recognize the distinction be-
tween speech the government supports and speech that it merely al-
lows in a place that traditionally has been open to a range of private
speakers accompanied, if necessary, by an appropriate disclaimer. '5
B. The Doctrine's Confusions
Justice O'Connor's approach has been subjected to two poten-
tially fatal objections. The first is that she has not adequately ex-
plained why perceptions of endorsement ought to be so important for
purposes of deciding whether there has been an Establishment Clause
violation. The second is that she has not clarified how the test ought
to operate. Different judges are likely to reach different results-in-
deed, have reached different results-while purporting to apply the
same test. Moreover, it is not clear what arguments are available, even
in principle, that could resolve these differences. Thus, the endorse-
ment test does not introduce any certainty into the law. The two ob-
jections are related. The way in which Justice O'Connor has
developed the test over time has attenuated its link to her stated ratio-
nale for the test. Attention to the test's purposes, we shall argue be-
low, can clarify ambiguities in its application. Conversely, O'Connor's
lack of attention to the test's purposes has exacerbated its vagueness
in operation.
55. Id. at 779-80 (alteration in original) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)).
56. Id. at 780 (alteration in original) (quoting Ars. United for Separation of Church
and State v. Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1544 (6th Cir. 1992)).
57. Id. at 780.
58. Id. at 781.
59. Id. at 782.
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The purpose of the test, as she originally formulated it, was to
prevent a certain kind of political alienation. "The Establishment
Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political commu-
nity." ° Government may not take actions that send a symbolic mes-
sage that nonadherents to any particular religion are "outsiders, not
full members of the political community."'" This criterion, O'Connor
argues, is better able than any rival conception, such as the coercion-
based establishment standard proposed by Justice Kennedy,6 2 to "ade-
quately protect the religious liberty [and to] respect the religious di-
versity of the members of our pluralistic political community."6"
It is not obvious , however, how endorsement either threatens
religious liberty or fails to respect diversity. Endorsement as such is
purely symbolic. It does not restrict religious liberty in any tangible
way.64 As for respect for diversity, several commentators have won-
dered how endorsement is inconsistent with it:
[I]t is not clear why symbolic exclusion should matter so
long as "nonadherents" are in fact actually included in the
political community. Under those circumstances, nonadher-
ents who believe that they are excluded from the political
community are merely expressing the disappointment felt by
everyone who has lost a fair fight in the arena of politics.
6 5
To ask that no one be alienated from the results of political decision-
making is to ask too much. In a pluralistic culture, alienation is inevi-
table. "[S]ome beliefs must, but not all beliefs can, achieve
recognition and ratification in the nation's laws and public policies;
and those whose positions are not so favored will sometimes feel like
'outsiders.' 
"66
Not only has Justice O'Connor failed to defend her alienation-
based rationale for the endorsement test, but she has herself been
unfaithful to that rationale in her development of the test. The shift
away from the perceptions of actual people to those of a fictitious ob-
jective observer means that judicial decisions will often turn on facts
60. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 688.
62. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-63 (1989) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. at 628 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. See Neal R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An
Alternative to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAIL L. REv. 53, 65-67 (1990).
65. Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REv. 701, 712 (1986) (foot-
note omitted); see also Smith, supra note 4, at 307.
66. Smith, supra note 4, at 313.
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that have nothing to do with the message that is actually received in
the community. 67 It will sometimes turn out that the "objective ob-
server" is untroubled by messages that cause intense alienation in the
actual members of the community. Because Supreme Court opinions
are reported by newspapers and read by the public, Justice
O'Connor's approach exacerbates the very alienation it ostensibly
seeks to combat. Jews may be offended by a state-sponsored nativity
display, but at least the display does not subject them to a lecture, as
some of Justice O'Connor's opinions do, expressing why they are un-
reasonable to feel offended!
But perhaps this offense would be tolerable if Justice O'Connor
had some basis for attributing the views she does to the objective ob-
server. In practice, however, the basis for determining the objective
observer's views has proven elusive. It is doubtful whether her refer-
ence in Pinette to the standard of the reasonable person in tort law
68
can provide the needed clarification. The reasonable person in tort
law is a judicially constructed standard of conduct, but the conduct
that is judged by that standard is different from the conduct that the
judge herself is engaged in. In Establishment Clause litigation, the
question the objective observer must answer is precisely the question
that the judge must answer.6" Recall Justice O'Connor's statement
that "courts should assume that the 'objective observer' is acquainted
with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes."7 Michael
McConnell observes that "[a] n objective observer holding separation-
ist views of the First Amendment might be quick to perceive govern-
ment's contact with religion as endorsement," while one with a
different view of the religion clauses might have a different reaction.7 1
67. Neal Feigenson notes two telling examples from O'Connor's own opinions:
In Lynch, for instance, how many viewers of Pawtucket's creche were familiar with
the city council debates and public pronouncements that preceded its installa-
tion? Or, more strikingly, in Wallace, how many Alabama schoolchildren author-
ized to meditate or pray silently were conversant with the legislative history which
the court found so crucial?
Feigenson, supra note 64, at 87. O'Connor's citation to the legislative history in both these
cases may also suggest that she was using the endorsement test as a test of intent rather
than effect. In this case, too, the content of the test would not correspond to its purpose.
See Smith, supra note 4, at 293-95.
68. See supra text accompanying note 55 (noting Justice O'Connor's statement regard-
ing the reasonable person in tort law).
69. Thus it is unsurprising that, asJustice Stevens notes, O'Connor's objective observer
"comes off as a well-schooled jurist, a being finer than the tort-law model." Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 800 n.5 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
71. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 48.
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Looking to the objective observer's perspective thus provides no gui-
dance at all. It is as if a legislature were to write a criminal code in-
structing the police and courts to "punish wrongdoing," with no
specification of what wrongdoing consists of. Thus, McConnell con-
cludes that "[i] fJustice O'Connor's 'objective observer' standard were
adopted by the courts, we would know nothing more than that judges
will decide cases the way they think they should be decided. '7 2
Neal Feigenson observes that O'Connor's approach "rests on a
flawed philosophy of language."73 Contemporary theories of meaning
reject the notion that words have an objective content that uniquely
determines their message. Rather, the audience plays a role in the
creation of meaning. "To identify 'what is normally conveyed' to the
community by government action is not necessarily to fix a single,
'normative' meaning. What is normally conveyed may well be a vari-
ety of messages to different audiences."74 The judicial imposition of a
single meaning on a message is inconsistent with " [t]he very purpose
of the religion clauses," which is "to protect minority and even idiosyn-
cratic modes of belief and understanding. '' 5
The fundamental problem, Steven Smith argues, is that the cul-
tural meaning of arguably religious messages is likely to be ambiguous
and contested. 76 Any particular governmental action-the granting
of conscientious objector status, say-will or will not constitute illegiti-
mate endorsement, depending on whether it is appropriate for gov-
ernment to take that substantive action. Different people in society
will have different views about the substantive issues, and their opin-
ions about whether endorsement has occurred will follow from those
substantive views. "Because perspectives are in fact incurably diverse,
a policy against creating perceptions that government has endorsed or
disapproved of religion can provide no grounds for identifying one
perspective, or one conception of neutrality, as correct. '77 The en-
dorsement test thus is parasitic on some substantive vision of what it is
appropriate for government to do. It cannot be a substitute for that
substantive vision.
72. Id.
73. Feigenson, supra note 64, at 83.
74. Id. at 85.
75. Id. at 86.
76. Smith, supra note 4, at 323.
77. Id.
78. See id. passim; see also Theodore C. Hirt, "Symbolic Union" of Church and State and the
"Endorsement" of Sectarian Activity: A Critique of Unwieldy Tools of Establishment Clause Jurispru-
dence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 823, 843 (1989); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at
a Crossroads, 59 U. Ci. L. REv. 115, 148-51, 192 (1992).
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The members of the Court who have rejected or sought to limit
the endorsement test have focused on its uncertainty in application.
Justice Kennedy's criticism spoke of the test's probable baleful ef-
fects,79 but he also worried that the creche decisions, relying as they
did on the details of how holiday displays were set up,
could provide workable guidance to the lower courts, if ever,
only after this Court has decided a long series of holiday dis-
play cases, using little more than intuition and a tape mea-
sure. Deciding cases on the basis of such an unguided
examination of marginalia is irreconcilable with the impera-
tive of applying neutral principles in constitutional
adjudication."s
In Pinette, Justice Scalia argued that the application of the endorse-
ment test in the context of public fora would require state deci-
sionmakers "to guess whether some undetermined critical mass of the
community might nonetheless perceive the [government] to be advo-
cating a religious viewpoint."'" Even if there were agreement on
whose perspective governs, Scalia argued, "it will be unrealistic to ex-
pect different judges (or should it be juries?) to reach consistent an-
swers as to what any beholder, the average beholder, or the
ultrareasonable beholder (as the case may be) would think. It is irre-
sponsible to make the Nation's legislators walk this minefield."8 2
II. A FRESH START
We think that the endorsement test has a sound basis in the Es-
tablishment Clause, and that it can be operationalized in a clear way.
We propose a revision of the endorsement test, both at its foundations
and in operation. The revision at these two points is necessarily
linked. Once the rationale for the endorsement test has been estab-
lished, it is important not to forget that rationale, asJustice O'Connor
has done, when working out its applications. And those applications
must have determinate results, as Justice O'Connor's formulations
manifestly do not.
79. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("Few of our traditional practices recognizing the part
religion plays in our society can withstand scrutiny under a faithful application of this
formula.").
80. Id. at 675-76.
81. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 767 (1995) (plurality
opinion).
82. Id. at 769 n.3.
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A. Establishment Clause Fundamentals
Begin with the foundations. We start from a premise that is, we
hope, uncontroversial. The Establishment Clause forbids government from
declaring religious truth.83
The Clause is in part a restriction on government speech. It pre-
vents government from offering an official position on what God has
commanded, or what beliefs or rituals most closely reflect God's will.
The doctrine in this respect is settled:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.
It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-
religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion
or religious theory against another or even against the mili-
tant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmen-
tal neutrality between religion and religion, and between
religion and nonreligion.8 4
If this much is accepted, then the prohibition of endorsement is
an obvious corollary. If government cannot declare religious truth,
then it cannot engage in conduct that amounts to a declaration of
religious truth. Justice Kennedy, who happens to be the Court's most
vocal critic of the endorsement test, offered an example of such con-
duct, namely: "the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the
roof of city hall.
8 5
83. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
"The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect."... The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware
of the varied and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement
among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on which all men would
agree. They fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the widest possi-
ble toleration of conflicting views. Man's relation to his God was made no con-
cern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he pleased and to answer
to no man for the verity of his religious views. The religious views espoused by
respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if
those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth
or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When
the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain.
Id. (citation omitted).
84. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
85. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Kennedy explained:
Symbolic recognition or accommodation of religious faith may violate the Clause
in an extreme case. I doubt not, for example, that the Clause forbids a city to
permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall. This
is not because government speech about religion is per se suspect, as the majority
would have it, but because such an obtrusive year-round religious display would
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What, precisely, would be wrong with erecting that cross? There
are several answers, and all of them have to do with the public percep-
tion of the cross's meaning. To see why perception ever matters, we
must begin with the justifications for having an Establishment Clause
in the first place.
One justification for the Clause is respect for individual con-
science. There is considerable disagreement about what "respect"
amounts to in practice, butJustice O'Connor's account, at least in her
earlier decisions, indicates that it means the avoidance of a certain
kind of political alienation on the part of religious minorities.8 6 If this
is right, then the perceptions of those minorities matter. The prob-
lem with endorsement is that it "sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community. ''s
A second justification for the Establishment Clause is that it pro-
motes civil peace. "[P] olitical division along religious lines was one of
the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect."8 In a pluralistic society, we cannot possibly agree on which
religious propositions the state should endorse. The argument for
government avoiding support for any religious view is that, unlike gov-
ernment endorsement of any particular religious propositions, it is
not in principle impossible for everyone to agree to a rule of neutral-
ity.89 Here, again, perceptions matter: is government in fact being
understood as endorsing propositions that some citizens (almost cer-
tainly, religious minorities) cannot possibly agree to?
A third classic justification for the Establishment Clause holds
that religion is not helped and may even be harmed by government
support:
place the government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf
of a particular religion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Justice Kennedy has sought to make coercion an indispensable element of an Estab-
lishment Clause claim. See id. at 659-62 (explaining that "government may not coerce any-
one to support or participate in any religion or its exercise"); id. at 659-62 (discussing and
applying this coercion standard). He has not explained, however, what is coercive about
proselytization.
86. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id. O'Connor does go on to say that endorsement also conveys "an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community,"
id., but without the alienation of the minorities, it is not clear why this should be a prob-
lem. A community is supposed to make its members feel like they belong, isn't it?
88. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
89. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 322
(1996); McConnell, supra note 78, at 162-63.
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[The Establishment Clause's] first and most immediate pur-
pose rested on the belief that a union of government and
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade relig-
ion. The history of governmentally established religion,
both in England and in this country, showed that whenever
government had allied itself with one particular form of re-
ligion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the
hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held con-
trary beliefs. That same history showed that many people had
lost their respect for any religion that had relied upon the
support of government to spread its faith. The Establish-
ment Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on the
part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too
personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed per-
version' by a civil magistrate.9 °
John Garvey notes that this "futility" argument has roots in the
theological idea that "God's revelation is progressive," so that free in-
quiry will bring us closer to God;9 1 but it can also take the form of a
sociological argument that state sponsorship tends to diminish respect
for religion,9 2 or a skeptical argument that the state does not know
enough to justify preferring any particular religious view.93
The futility rationale means that government ought not to de-
clare religious truth, because this will impede, rather than help, citi-
zens' search for that truth. Douglas Laycock's indictment is typical:
"Government-sponsored religion is theologically and liturgically thin.
It is politically compliant. It is supportive of incumbent administra-
tions."9 4 These generalizations are not universally accurate-try ap-
plying them to the regimes of Mohammed or Calvin, or the religious
90. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
91. John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 275, 285 (1996).
92. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERiCA 287-301, 442-52 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
Doubleday 1969) (1840).
93. "The one only narrow way which leads to heaven is not better known to the magis-
trate than to private persons," Locke wrote, "and therefore I cannot safely take him for my
guide who may probably be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is less
concerned for my salvation than I myself am." JOHN LOCKE, A LETrER CONCERNING TOLER-
ATION 32 (Patrick Romanell ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1950) (1689).
James Madison wrote that the idea "that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of
Religious Truth" is "an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rul-
ers in all ages." James Madison, To the Honorable the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Virginia: A Memorial and Remonstrance, in MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIG-
IOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOcIETv 64, 66 (1996).
94. Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAuL L. REv. 373, 380
(1992).
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establishments of Israel or Iran1 5 -but they probably describe any pos-
sible establishment in the United States.
In tolerant communities, efforts to be all-inclusive inevitably
lead to desacralization, to the least common denominator, to
a secular incarnation with plastic reindeer, to Christmas and
Chanukah mushed together as the Winter Holidays. By strip-
ping all the specific elements of different faiths and denomi-
nations and attempting to keep only the common elements
that all faiths share, tolerant governments produce a mish-
mash that no faith can accept or believe in. 6
De Tocqueville's argument against establishment held that alli-
ance with politicians would weaken religion's moral hold on people's
allegiances. 7 The mirror image of that claim is that holding political
power not only fails to enhance one's competence in religious mat-
ters, but actually impairs it. The ends that political leaders must pur-
sue are not religious, and if they are given power over religion they
will probably be induced by the imperatives of their tasks to distort
religion for political purposes. The nature of government, so the ar-
gument goes, is such that it is an unusually poor judge of religious
truth. Here, again, it matters whether the government's conduct in
question is actually affecting religion-though here the relevant relig-
ion, the established religion, is likely to be that of the majority. And
in that inquiry, it is highly relevant whether the population under-
stands the state to be instructing them about religion.
Each of these claims is a contingent one, depending on the out-
comes that are actually produced by the government action in ques-
tion. Matthew Adler observes that the claim that a given kind of
expression causes a given kind of harm
will be persuasive just insofar as (1) there is sufficient empiri-
cal evidence for the claimed, causal regularity; (2) there is
sufficient theoretical warrant for the claimed, causal regular-
ity; and (3) the case at hand (the case of this particular kind
of speech, in this particular state of the world) is subsumed
under the regularity.98
In each of the cases of harm we have just considered, expression is, at
a minimum, quite likely to be part of the causal sequence that the
Constitution seeks to prevent.
95. This objection was raised by our colleague, Ron Allen.
96. Laycock, supra note 94, at 380 (footnote omitted).
97. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 92, at 297-98.
98. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1363, 1496 (2000).
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This brings us to the limits of the endorsement test as a means of
operationalizing the Establishment Clause. None of the harms just
considered requires government expression endorsing religion. Each
of them can occur without endorsement.. This is part of the reason
why the endorsement test cannot be more than a component of the
Establishment Clause doctrine. State manipulation of religion, for in-
stance, could be accomplished by means that do not convey a message
of endorsement, such as, say, secret payments to one religious group
to subsidize proselytization. And many actions could bring about po-
litical alienation of minorities other than endorsement of the major-
ity's religion.99
Perhaps the best justification for an "objective observer" ap-
proach is that it is well suited to the institutional limitations of the
judiciary. 00 Adler, while skeptical of theories of law that give expres-
sion a central place, concedes that there may be good reasons for
courts to give a doctrinal role to the objective meaning of a law. It
might be, for example, that a cultural-impact test would be difficult
for courts to administer, while a test that focuses on objective meaning
would be more administrable.''
99. This point is emphasized by Adler. Id. at 1438-48.
100. For this reason, one of us has endorsed the use of an objective test to determine
whether a law has a secular purpose and thus satisfies the first prong of Lemon. See Andrew
Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002). We agree with Raskin on
this point. See Raskin, supra note 14 (auth. rev. manu. at 8). We do not intend, as he
claims we do, "to abolish doctrinal focus on the purpose of governmental action," or to
"discard the objective purpose analysis altogether," id. at - (auth. rev. manu. at 9, 13). We
only take issue with his claim that evidence of perceived meaning is irrelevant to the deter-
mination of objective meaning. The term "objective," when applied to social reality, can
intelligibly mean only the reality that is a shared belief of the natives, so that it presents
itself to any individual as objective. See generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKIMANN,
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
(1966). A crucifix is objectively a religious symbol, but only because the natives of our
culture overwhelmingly take it to be so.
The purposes of the Establishment Clause just considered in the text provide two
reasons why the perceived meaning of a government action may be relevant to adjudica-
tion. If the goal of the Clause is to prevent political alienation, then courts should ask
whether this result has occurred. If the goal of the Clause is to prevent government from
endorsing an official religious line, then courts should ask whether that result has oc-
curred. We are uncertain why Raskin rejects these reasons.
101. SeeAdler, supra note 98, at 1437; Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic
"Expression, "and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply to Anderson and Pildes, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000). One of us has argued elsewhere that this formulation under-
states the inherent importance of expression. See Andrew Koppelman, On the Moral Foun-
dations of Legal Expressivism, 60 MD. L. REv. 777 (2001). However, this criticism of Adler is
more germane to Equal Protection than to Establishment, since devaluing beliefs is not as
bad as devaluing persons. See Andrew Koppelman, Akhil Amar and the Establishment Clause,
33 U. RICH. L. REv. 393 (1999).
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But those same institutional limitations must be taken into ac-
count in evaluating an objective-observer test. Precisely because
judges' performance in this area has not covered them with glory, a
dose of reality may be helpful. The subjective, perceived meaning of a
law may shed light on the law's objective meaning. It is even more
likely to be relevant, of course, if it is the very thing that the courts are
looking for. Intention, meaning, and understanding bleed into each
other, causally and epistemologically.10 2 In the normal case of suc-
cessful communication, they correspond to one another because they
form a causal sequence: I think of a dodo, I say the word "dodo," and
now you're thinking about a dodo, too. This causal relation means
that each step in the sequence is evidence that the others have oc-
curred. The fact that the word has an objective sentence meaning
entitles you to infer that I was thinking about a dodo. After I said the
word, I was entitled to infer that you understood what I was saying.
And the epistemology can travel in the opposite direction in the
causal sequence, so that cause can be inferred from effect. If you're a
typical speaker of the language, and you understood me to refer to a
dodo, your understanding is evidence that the word means a dodo
and I intended to refer to a dodo. Even if one accepts an "objective
observer" standard, then, evidence of actual perceptions is probative
of what an objective observer would observe. 0 3
102. We plead guilty to the "deep loss of confidence in the ability of courts" that Raskin
charges us with, Raskin, supra note 14, at 776, but that loss of confidence is not gratuitous;
it has been earned. Raskin proposes to amend that test in order to ask " 'what viewers may
fairly understand to be the purpose of the government's placement of religious elements in the
display.' " Id. at 763. This proposal makes sense to us, but we note that at one point he
seems to turn it from a context-sensitive test into a per se rule: "As long as there is a
recognizably religious element in the display, it constitutes an impermissible endorse-
ment." Id. at 770. This would render unconstitutional the name of the city of San Fran-
cisco. To avoid such difficulties, it still would be helpful to have data about what a display
actually means to its audience. In his creche example, Raskin claims that "the most plausible
purpose" for adding the Christian nativity scene is to endorse Christianity, id., but one can
think of many other plausible purposes. It might be that one thinks that the nativity is just
an attractive way to decorate a public place, or that one wants to acknowledge Christianity
as one of a number of identities that are celebrated at various times of the year. Judges'
tendency to invent such reasons would be curbed if it were permissible to introduce
evidence.
103. For this reason, we can make no sense of Raskin's claim-which, unlike some of his
other arguments, see supra note 14, really does take issue with our thesis-that evidence of
perceived religious meaning is not even "relevant" to Establishment Clause cases. Raskin,
supra note 14, at 763.
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B. Social Meaning and the Fourteenth Amendment
In other contexts, the Court is able to work quite well with the
social meanings that are actually perceived by real people. Compare
another constitutional provision that restricts government speech:
the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 4 The social meaning of government
action has always been understood to be relevant to the determination
of whether a law denies to some "the equal protection of the laws."'
10 5
In Strauder v. West Virginia,'0 6 the first race discrimination case to
reach the Supreme Court after the Civil War, the Court struck down a
state law excluding blacks from juries.1 °7 The Court declared that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects blacks "from legal discriminations,
implying inferiority in civil society."108 The exclusion of blacks, the
Court held, was "practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an
assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice
which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others."'0 9
This focus on social meaning became a problem for the Court
when it had to decide the constitutionality of segregation laws in Plessy
v. Ferguson.i t ° There, the plaintiffs argued that the law was unconstitu-
tional because it "stamps the colored race with a badge of inferi-
ority."11t The Court responded in the same way that the critics of the
endorsement test have-by noting the fragmentation of social mean-
ing. "If this be so," the Court concluded, "it is not by reason of any-
thing found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it.""' 2
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy is widely celebrated, but he, like
the majority, makes claims about social meaning based on pure ipse
dixit:
104. Justice O'Connor has noted the analogy between her test and the Court's role in
this area:
[W] hether a government activity communicates endorsement of religion is not a
question of simple historical fact. Although evidentiary submissions may help an-
swer it, the question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based classifications
communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be answered
on the basis ofjudicial interpretation of social facts.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
106. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
107. Id. at 310.
108. Id. at 308.
109. Id.
110. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
111. Id. at 551.
112. Id.
2001] 733
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in
the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from rail-
road cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people
from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons. Rail-
road corporations of Louisiana did not make discrimination
among whites in the matter of accommodation for travellers.
The thing to accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal
accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel the latter
to keep to themselves while travelling in railroad passenger
coaches. No one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the
contrary.
• . . What can more certainly arouse race hate, what
more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust be-
tween these races, than state enactments, which, in fact, pro-
ceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and
degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches
occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real
meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana. '
The italicized passages were obviously false. Harlan's claims
about what "all will admit" were already belied by the very majority
opinion to which he was responding. "All" did not admit that the stat-
ute's purpose was what Harlan alleged, and it is not clear that those
who did not admit it were "wanting in candor." David Strauss observes
that "it is not obvious that the architects ofJim Crow invariably desired
to hurt blacks."' 1
4
Nonetheless, Plessy was an easy case. Social meaning may have
been somewhat fragmented, but the association of segregation with
racism was sufficiently clear that, as Charles Black famously noted,
laughter was the appropriate response to the assertion that blacks
113. Id. at 557, 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
114. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CuI. L. REV.
935, 964 (1989). According to Strauss,
[s]ome of them may have sincerely desired only to promote social stability and
the harmonious development of both races. Some may have sincerely believed
that segregation aided blacks. Or they may have recognized its harmful effects
but considered them a regrettable byproduct of a system that was the best for
society as a whole.
Id.; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 passim (1987) (arguing that because government
actors are part of a culture that is saturated with racial prejudice, they cannot act without
being influenced by racial considerations, even if they are unaware of them).
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were being treated equally." 5 In Brown v. Board of Education,1 1 6 Black
argued, the question before the Court was
whether discrimination inheres in that segregation which is
imposed by law in the twentieth century in certain specific
states in the American Union. And that question has mean-
ing and can find an answer only on the ground of history
and of common knowledge about the facts of life in the
times and places aforesaid." 7
The easiness of Plessy and Brown does, however, leave us with a
question as to what to do with harder cases. Black thought it obvious
that racial segregation connoted the inferiority of blacks,"' but admit-
ted that "the subjectively obvious, if queried, must be backed up by
more public materials.""' 9 He relied on indisputable facts of history,
custom, and law to assure "that [his] reading of the social meaning of
segregation is not a mere idiosyncrasy."12 ° When the social meaning
of a given practice is more ambiguous or contested than that of overt
racial segregation, it is not clear how a court should respond to a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge. Thus, for example, it is far from
clear whether states violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they fly
the Confederate flag over their capitals, because it is unclear whether
the flag symbolizes racism (as some think) or, rather, merely com-
memorates history and promotes tourism (as others think). James
Forman argues that the flag should be held unconstitutional because
it "has been adopted knowingly and consciously by government offi-
cials seeking to assert their commitment to black subordination."'
2 1
Sanford Levinson, who is unpersuaded by innocent explanations of
the flag, is nonetheless uneasy about the prospect of a federal court
banning the flag on this basis: "If, though, multiple interpretations
are genuinely possible, if the flag is truly polysemous, then how pre-
cisely can a federal court (or anyone else) justify in effect negating all
115. Charles L. Black,Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424
(1960). Raskin's suggestion that survey data would have disconfirmed this strikes us as
equally risible. See Raskin, supra note 14, at 774-75.
116. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
117. Black, supra note 115, at 427.
118. See id. at 424.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. James Forman, Jr., Note, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag from
Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505, 513-14 (1991).
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other interpretive possibilities save the particular one that it chooses
to privilege?" '22
What is needed, in the contexts of both Equal Protection and the
Establishment Clause, is an authoritative way to resolve disputes about
social meaning. Sometimes, as in Plessy, a single social meaning is so
predominant that the existence of idiosyncratic views doesn't matter.
In other cases, there will be a variety of widely held views. What
should be done in the doubtful cases?
III. OPERATIONALIZING ENDORSEMENT
The problem of social meaning is not unique to constitutional
law. It is familiar in trademark law. In that field of law, courts have
increasingly recognized their own limitations and accepted better (al-
beit imperfect) gauges of social meaning, including survey evidence
and the testimony of expert witnesses on the quality of such evidence.
This approach, we argue, is readily available to assist in addressing
analogous issues in constitutional law.
A. The Relevance of Trademark Law
In this Section, we describe the relevant rules of trademark law
and consider their applicability in the context of the Establishment
Clause.
1. Perception in Trademark and Establishment Clause Cases.-The le-
gal question in a typical case of trademark infringement is whether
the consumer is likely to be confused about the relationship or affilia-
tion between the plaintiff's products or services and the defendant's
products or services. 23 This question flows directly from the purposes
of trademark law. One traditional justification for creating an exclu-
sive right in a name or other trademark is that such a restriction pro-
tects the public by preventing consumer confusion. 124 Consumers use
names (and other distinctive marks) to identify products and services
that have previously pleased them, as well as those with which they
have had bad experiences. 125 Trademarks thus provide information
on the reputation of the source of a product and on the quality of the
122. Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on Rags, Monuments, and State Holidays,
and the Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicultural Society, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1079,
1102 (1995); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANG-
ING SOCIETIES 90-110 (1998).
123. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
124. MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 7.01[B] (4th ed. 1999).
125. See id.
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producer. 126 If a mark does not accurately signal a single source, the
consumer cannot use the mark to make any inference about prefer-
ence or quality. For example, if a consumer is induced to visit The
Sign of the Beefeater restaurant because he or she believes that it has
a business connection with a well-known or respected source (e.g., a
popular liquor producer), and there is actually no business connec-
tion between the two, the consumer not only has been misled, but also
may be disappointed if the restaurant does not meet the consumer's
expectations. Moreover, the consumer may, based on that disap-
pointing experience, be persuaded to lower his estimate of the quality
of the liquor company's products and to search for some other source
for an acceptable gin.
A more indirect benefit to consumers is the incentive created by
trademark protection for companies to invest in the quality of the
products they produce. If a consumer considering whether to
purchase a can of soup from the grocery store could not tell whether
it was produced by the company that was responsible for the can of
soup she had just consumed with gusto, she would have no reliable
way to re-stock her shelf with soup from the same source. Similarly,
the company making the soup would have no incentive to produce a
high or consistent quality soup that would stimulate repeat purchases.
An exclusive right to a distinctive mark increases the incentive for a
company to accumulate consumer goodwill by investing in quality,
reputation, and service.
Consumer confusion as to the source of a product or service is
thus the touchstone of trademark infringement. The perceptions of
the audience are central, just as we suggest they should be when a
court is asked to consider whether the Establishment Clause has been
violated by a public display. For example, in a classic trademark in-
fringement case, a federal court was called upon to determine
whether a new restaurant, The Sign of the Beefeater, was infringing
the trademark rights of the owner of the trademark "Beefeater
Gin." '2 7 To assess whether those rights were being violated, the court
had to decide whether a consumer who encountered a sign for the
restaurant was likely to infer that the liquor company that produces
Beefeater Gin also owned or was sponsoring the restaurant.12
126. See id.
127. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 273 (7th Cir.
1976).
128. Id. at 274. Trademark infringement would have also occurred if consumers were
likely to believe that the producers of Beefeater Gin had authorized or licensed the use of
the name, The Sign of the Beefeater. See id. The same principle applies when companies
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The analogous allegation in an Establishment Clause case would
be that a display or symbol conveys a message of governmental en-
dorsement of religion. For example, when a community member en-
counters a public display in front of city hall in the month of
December that includes a lone nativity scene, the court, applying the
endorsement test, must determine whether community members are
likely to assume that the display is expressing support for a particular
set of religious views.
In the trademark infringement suit involving Beefeater, the pro-
ducer of Beefeater Gin was able to convince the court that consumers
were likely to believe there was a business connection with the new
restaurant, and the court found that the distiller was entitled to pre-
vent the restaurant from using the confusing name.' 29 Similarly, in
our hypothetical Establishment Clause case involving the creche in
front of city hall, if community members were likely to see an expres-
sion or authorization of religious support by government in the partic-
ular display, a court applying a Lanham Act-like standard would
enjoin the presentation of the display in this public setting. If the
evidence revealed that community members did not take a message of
governmental religious support from the display, the creche would
survive attack under the Establishment Clause. Although this over-
view reveals that audience perceptions play a role in both trademark
and Establishment Clause cases, two issues arguably differ in the two
domains: identifying whose perceptions matter, and the role of inten-
tions in determining whether a violation has occurred.
2. Whose Perceptions Matter.-Justice O'Connor has identified
perceptions as key to understanding the reach of the Establishment
Clause, but has not made it clear whose perceptions constitute the
relevant standard. Her standard is the "objective observer," but as
we' 30 and others"' have pointed out, it is unclear what she means by
not licensed to sell shirts that display a professional team logo are enjoined from doing so
based on evidence that consumers are likely to believe that the use of the logo was author-
ized or licensed by the professional team. See Nat'l Football League Props., Inc. v. Wichita
Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 651, 658-59 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
129. See Burrough, 540 F.2d at 279 (finding that a significant percentage of the restau-
rant-going public would mistakenly believe that the restaurant's sign was promoting Beef-
eater Gin).
130. See supra notes 26-59 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 71, at 48 (explaining that one's perceptions of gov-
ernment contact with religion may depend on how one views the issue of separation of
church and state); Smith, supra note 4, at 292 and accompanying text (arguing that the
idealized objective observer "will perceive precisely as much, and only as much, as its au-
thor wants it to perceive").
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"objective." At times, she seems merely to be contrasting the subjec-
tive view of the source of the message (the intent of the sender to
endorse or not to endorse a particular religious view) with the view of
the recipient of the message, who views the display itself but is not
privy to the intent of the source of the message. 13 2 At other times, she
seems to have the perspective of a particular audience member in
mind.13 3 The trier of fact must determine what the perceptions of the
"objective observer" are likely to be. The difficulty is that perceptions
of governmental endorsement may vary when a symbol is not unam-
biguously nonsecular (i.e., it consists of a nativity scene rather than an
image of, for example, Smokey the Bear), so the first step, deciding
whose perceptions matter, presents a challenge.
The natural reference point for a judge determining either
whether trademark infringement has occurred or whether the govern-
ment has conveyed a message of religious endorsement is what he or
she perceives the meaning of the message or symbol to be. A personal
reaction from a judicial perspective, however, has explicitly been re-
jected in trademark jurisprudence 34 and, for similar reasons, cannot
be conclusive in the context of the Establishment Clause.
We are not suggesting that the judge's own views on the message
that the symbol is likely to convey are never relevant. In some cases,
they may be sufficient. In a trademark case, if the alleged infringer
has labeled a product that directly competes with the plaintiffs prod-
uct with a literal, exact copy of the plaintiffs trademark, then the
court may take notice of this fact and grant relief accordingly. 135 An
analogous situation arises in Lanham Act cases involving deceptive ad-
vertising. When an advertising statement is literally or explicitly,
rather than implicitly, false, the court may grant relief without refer-
ence to the advertisement's impact on the buying public. 136 In such
easy cases, there is no need for a plaintiff to go to the considerable
expense of conducting a survey. Similarly, there may be displays that
are unambiguously religious. Justice Kennedy, we noted earlier,
132. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 43, 45, 53-56.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 144-146.
135. See Opticians Ass'n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir.
1990) ("[L]ikelihood of confusion is inevitable, when, as in this case, the identical mark is
used concurrently by unrelated entities."); Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art
Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (explaining that where marks are "virtu-
ally identical . . .consumer confusion is inevitable").
136. Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson &Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978)); Am.
Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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would draw the line at "the permanent erection of a large Latin cross
on the roof of city hall." 3 But not all cases are this easy. When there
is disagreement about the meaning of a display, the judge's own views
are not a reliable indicator of what the display means to other mem-
bers of society.
The judge's personal views may not reflect the perspectives of
other observers who do not share the judge's personal, educational,
and other background experiences."' Of course, Justice O'Connor
talks about the perspective of the objective observer rather than ajudi-
cial perspective, but judges are not immune from falling prey to false
consensus,'39 which is the well-documented tendency for people to as-
sume that others share their personal attitudes and beliefs. 4 ° Indeed,
Justice O'Connor has on occasion suggested the image of a very par-
ticular observer as her standard-"an objective observer, acquainted
137. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
138. This will be true even if, as we join Raskin in hoping, organized political action
succeeds in placing on the bench "Supreme Court justices who are able to take into ac-
count the full breadth of society in envisioning the meaning of public action for the pur-
poses of constitutional analysis." Raskin, supra note 14, at 775 n.52. In a pluralistic society,
even the most enlightened judge can benefit from information. Even a judge who has
"profound historical and social consciousness, wisdom, judgment, and a sense of the deep
values of the Constitution," id. at 776, may not be able to discern what a display means for
religious minorities. Raskin sometimes appears to have a radically exaggerated view of
judicial autonomy, as when he argues that "if the court itself must determine the constitu-
tional meaning of the semiotics of a government-erected display ... then it is hard to see
how the actual perceptions of a certain randomly assembled group of citizens are even
relevant to the endorsement analysis." Id. at 763. Is Raskin suggesting that when a court
needs to make a determination, no evidence of what is happening in the world outside the
judge's mind is even relevant? If so, courts would be able (and perhaps would be re-
quired) to dispense with testimony in all cases.
139. See generally Lee Ross et al., The "False Consensus Effect": An Egocentric Bias in Social
Perception and Attribution Processes, 13J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 279 (1977) (discussing
the tendency to find one's own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively common).
140. Several recent studies comparing judges with laypersons have revealed that judges
are susceptible to some of the same cognitive biases that affect laypersons. See, e.g., John C.
Anderson et al., Evaluations ofAuditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap,
14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 730 (1993) (demonstrating that judges' evaluative judgments
can be dependent on their knowledge of "outcome information"); Britte Englich &
Thomas Mussweiler, Legal Judgment Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, J.
APPLIED Soc. PSYCH. (forthcoming) (demonstrating that judicial sentencing judgments in
rape cases were influenced by irrelevant anchors); Stephan Landsman & Richard Rakos, A
Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil
Litigation, 12 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 113, 125 (1994) (finding that 'judges and jurors in civil cases
react similarly when exposed to material that is subsequently ruled inadmissible-their
perceptions of central trial issues are altered"); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About
Risk?, 1 A-M. L. & ECON. REv. 26, 29 (1999) (indicating that judges' biases and personal
attitudes, "some of which have been documented for human behavior more generally,"
affect how they make risk-related decisions).
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with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute. '"141
Such a standard might suggest that a judicial perspective is relevant,
or at least that legal training would be required to understand and
interpret the message being conveyed by the display in dispute. Fa-
miliarity with the statutory text will be beyond the expertise or knowl-
edge of most of the lay community members who are likely to
encounter the display. An alternative interpretation of Justice
O'Connor's meaning is that she is recognizing the importance of con-
text in influencing how an observer understands the meaning of the
controversial display. Thus, if a statute permitted the construction of
displays in a public area on a first-come-first-served basis, and that in-
formation were widely known, it might dispel the impression that
many community members would otherwise have: that the particular
display appearing in the public area reflected governmental endorse-
ment of the religious significance of the display.
In trademark litigation, the context of the purchase influences
the likelihood of confusion. For example, if the product at issue is
costly or if the purchasing audience is likely to exercise considerable
attention and inspect the product fairly closely, the likelihood of con-
fusion is smaller than when the goods are bought by purchasers who
are likely to engage in little or no inspection.' 42 Although the usual
standard is the typical buyer exercising ordinary caution, when a
buyer class is mixed, so that some consumers are more sophisticated
than others, "the standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably
prudent purchaser will be equal to that of the least sophisticated con-
sumer in the class."1
43
Before surveys of consumer perception were common in trade-
mark litigation, courts were often left to speculate on the likely reac-
tion of the relevant group of consumers. A number of judges
recognized the difficulties inherent in arriving at an accurate assess-
ment of what the perceptions of others, often quite different in back-
ground and experience, might be. For example, in reviewing the trial
court's decision on whether a manufacturer of girdles labeled "Miss
Seventeen" had infringed the trademark of the magazine, Seventeen,
Judge Frank suggested that in the absence of a test of the reactions of
numerous girls and women, the trial court judge's finding as to what
was likely to confuse was "nothing but a surmise, a conjecture, a
141. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729(d) (1938) (stating that one consideration in de-
termining whether a mark is confusingly similar is "the degree of care likely to be exercised
by purchasers").
143. Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293 (3d Cir. 1991).
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guess."' 44 He noted that "neither the trial judge nor any member of
this court is (or resembles) a teen-age girl or the mother or sister of
such a girl."' 45 More recently, in a Lanham Act case involving an alle-
gation of deceptive advertising, the court observed that "the court's
reaction is at best not determinative and at worst irrelevant. The ques-
tion in such cases is-what does the person to whom the advertise-
ment is addressed find to be the message?"' 4 6 If the endorsement test
proposed by Justice O'Connor "focuses on how people perceive the
relationship between the state and religion,"'"47 then the relevant pop-
ulation of people includes more than judges. As we shall suggest be-
low, and as Justice O'Connor has sometimes indicated, the relevant
population includes both members of the majority and minority com-
munity members.
3. The Role of Intentions.-Violations of the Lanham Act can oc-
cur even in the absence of any allegation or proof that the defendant
intended to mislead the consumer.'48 The issue is whether the com-
munication had a deceptive effect.' 49 The issues of deceptive effect
and intent are not, however, completely independent. In the absence
of direct proof on likely consumer reaction, evidence that the defen-
dant intended to mislead can provide the basis for finding a Lanham
Act violation on the ground that the defendant is presumed to have
achieved its intended effect. 150
We do not agree with Justice O'Connor's view that a similar rule
should be followed in the Establishment Clause context, so that laws
would be condemned if they were enacted with the intention of en-
dorsing religion. Aside from the notorious difficulties of discerning
144. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dis-
senting). Judge Frank reported that he personally consulted "some adolescent girls and
their mother and sisters" to fill in the gap, acknowledging that his "method of obtaining
such data [was] not satisfactory," but characterizing it as "better than anything in this re-
cord to illuminate the pivotal fact." Id. His data collection, of course, would not pass
muster under either modern standards for judicial notice or acceptable survey practice.
145. Id.
146. Am. Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
147. Joel S. Jacobs, Endorsement as "Adoptive Action:" A Suggested Definition of and an Argu-
ment for, Justice O'Connor's Establishment Clause Test, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 29, 35 (1994).
148. E.g., Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 596
(5th Cir. 1985) ("Good faith is not a defense to trademark infringement. The reason for
this is clear: if potential purchasers are confused, no amount of good faith can make them
less so." (citations omitted)).
149. See id.
150. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir.
1987) ("Intentional copying gives rise to a presumption of a likelihood of confusion." (cit-
ing Perfect Fit Indus. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 954 (2d Cir. 1980))).
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governmental intent,' 5 ' none of the harms that the Establishment
Clause seeks to prevent are contingent on a decisionmaker's intent.
Moreover, it is not clear that intent to endorse a religious view is
always constitutionally problematic. Some citizens are religious. If
those citizens participate in politics, their political actions will inevita-
bly reflect their religious views. They may well regard their legislative
actions as endorsing those views. An endorsement test that invalidates
laws that have a religious meaning to their enactors would deny to
religious people their right to participate in politics.
Our cases in no way imply that the Establishment Clause for-
bids legislators merely to act upon their religious convic-
tions. We surely would not strike down a law providing
money to feed the hungry or shelter the homeless if it could
be demonstrated that, but for the religious beliefs of the leg-
islators, the funds would not have been approved. Also, po-
litical activism by the religiously motivated is part of our
heritage .... [W] e do not presume that the sole purpose of
a law is to advance religion merely because it was supported
strongly by organized religions or by adherents of particular
faiths. To do so would deprive religious men and women of
their right to participate in the political process. Today's re-
ligious activism may give us the Balanced Treatment Act, [in-
validated in Aguillard], but yesterday's resulted in the
abolition of slavery, and tomorrow's may bring relief for fam-
ine victims. 1
52
If the endorsement test is understood to "forbid the legislature
from making religiously-informed judgments, or basing legislation on
the religiously-informed judgments of their constituents," this not
only produces bizarre results, but is also "an invitation to mischief-a
not-so-subtle suggestion that those whose understandings of justice
are derived from religious sources are second-class citizens, forbidden
to work for their principles in the public sphere. 1 53 For this reason,
the endorsement test should hardly ever look at legislative intent.154
The central issue should be what message is actually communicated.
151. This difficulty is described in detail injustice Scalia's dissent in Edwards v. Agsuillard.
482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the "hazards" of trying to
determine governmental intent, such as making assessments from "contrived and sani-
tized" legislative histories).
152. Id. at 615 (citations omitted).
153. McConnell, supra note 78, at 144.
154. Although evidence of intent to advance a particular religious view may, as in Lan-
ham Act cases, suggest that the source has successfully achieved the desired effect, it is the
nature of the effect that matters.
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On the other hand, there can be clear cases of impermissible in-
tent. The most obvious is a case in which the law harms a religious
minority, and this was the legislators' intent. In such a case, it is un-
necessary to engage in an Establishment Clause analysis, because it is
clear that the Free Exercise Clause has been violated.
B. Designing the Survey
In this Section, we consider how to design a survey that would be
useful in resolving the endorsement question.
1. Providing Survey Evidence of Consumer Perceptions.-A properly
done survey provides an economical and systematic way to gather in-
formation about the reactions of a large number of individuals. 5 '
The informational value of survey results depends on the quality of
the survey. Quality is assessed by evaluating a number of features, in-
cluding whether the relevant population was identified, how the sam-
ple of respondents was selected, how the survey was structured, what
questions were asked, and how the results were analyzed. 156 We con-
sider each of these in a typical trademark survey' 57 and in our hypo-
thetical survey measuring endorsement.
155. Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Suruey Research, in REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 231-32 (2d ed. 2000).
156. See id. at 236-72.
157. In modern trademark litigation, surveys are frequently used in determining
whether a likelihood of confusion exists, but courts rely on a variety of factors in evaluating
likelihood of confusion. For example, Judge Friendly, in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics
Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), listed the following nonexhaustive set of factors to
consider:
the strength of [the] mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the
proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap,
actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own
mark, the quality of defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers.
Id. at 495.
Surveys are used as evidence of actual confusion (the fifth factor on the list). Eg.,
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987). No single factor on
the list is determinative and not all of the factors have to be proven, but good survey
evidence is generally enough to show infringement, and some courts have complained
when a plaintiff with sufficient resources fails to produce survey evidence. E.g., Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690,695 (2d Cir. 1994); Henri's Food Prods. Co.
v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 357 (7th Cir. 1983); E.S. Originals Inc. v. Stride Rite Corp., 656
F. Supp. 484, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Info. Clearing House, Inc. v. Find Magazine, 492 F.
Supp. 147, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The circuits vary in the list of factors they use, but the lists
are substantially overlapping. For example, the Seventh Circuit's list includes: "the type of
trademark in issue, the similarity of design, similarity of products, identity of retail outlets
and purchasers, identity of advertising media utilized, ... intent [of the alleged infringer],
and actual confusion." Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381-82 (7th
Cir. 1976) (citing Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45-46 (5th Cir. 1975).
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2. The Appropriate Population.-To assess consumer perceptions
in a trademark infringement case, a survey may be conducted to test
consumer reaction to the allegedly offending stimulus, for example,
the sign advertising the new restaurant. The first step in designing the
survey is to identify the relevant population. The allegedly infringing
The Sign of the Beefeater restaurant was in Chicago, so the relevant
population consisted of consumers in Chicago who were likely to be
exposed to the advertisement for the restaurant. 58 A suitable sample
was selected using a probability sampling procedure; the sample con-
sisted of heads of households (half male and half female) within a five
mile radius of the restaurant.15 The justification for selecting survey
respondents in the area of the restaurant is that they constituted the
group most likely to see the sign, and most likely to have a meal at the
restaurant. 164)
The target population for a survey to assess likelihood of con-
sumer confusion varies with the product or service. When EXXON
sued a motel named TEXON for trademark infringement, the rele-
vant population consisted of licensed automobile and truck drivers. 161
When the product was a toy marketed to children between the ages of
six and twelve, the relevant population consisted primarily of children
in that same age group (who were able to influence the purchase of
the toy).162 The failure to include a significant portion of the relevant
population weakens the strength of the survey.'
63
How should the relevant community be defined in a survey de-
signed to assess perceptions of endorsement? The answer will depend
on why we think endorsement matters. And this will in turn depend
158. SeeJames Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 277 (7th Cir.
1976).
159. Id.
160. An improvement on the survey, not mentioned by the court, would have been to
screen potential respondents to exclude individuals who had not recently visited any
restaurant.
161. SeeExxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir.
1980) (noting that both EXXON and TEXON appealed to a large audience of customers,
but the common trait among their customers was that they were all "members of the car
driving public").
162. See Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 857 (7th
Cir. 1982) (finding that the district court's decision as to likelihood of confusion was not
clearly erroneous when based on a survey conducted on children aged six to twelve, de-
spite the fact that the survey omitted "the upper teenage group, parents, and grandparents
who would presumably also purchase the toy").
163. See, e.g., Wendy's Int'l, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 816, 823 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(noting that the absence of respondents less than eighteen years old in a survey involving
fast food restaurants was problematic).
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on what we think is the point of having the Establishment Clause in
the first place.
Recall our earlier discussion. If the purpose of the Clause is re-
spect for conscience, then surveys ought to focus on members of relig-
ious minorities and find out what message is being conveyed to them.
If it is the preservation of civil peace, then one would again focus on
the perceptions of minorities, perhaps attempting to discern the de-
gree to which they are offended.
1 64
If the purpose of the Clause is to prevent religion from being
distorted and harmed by government support, then surveys must be
targeted at a more inclusive population. This reasoning implies that
the question that surveys should attempt to answer is whether (a sig-
nificant percentage of) the population, including members of the majority
religion, think that a display conveys a religious message. 65 If the ma-
jority thinks so, then it is fair to conclude that an official government
line is being conveyed and, perhaps, accepted. The most pertinent
population may even be those persons who adhere to the religion that
government is endorsing, because they are likely to be far more vul-
nerable to the deleterious effects of the message being conveyed than
are members of minority religions. Baby Jesus surrounded by candy
canes and Rudolph is unlikely to have a degrading effect on the religi-
osity ofJews who view the display, but Christians may be more vulnera-
ble to this sort of manipulation.
These rationales do not compete with one another. On the con-
trary, they are mutually reinforcing, and the Court routinely cites
them in tandem. Government action would thus seem to threaten the
purposes of the Establishment Clause if it either alienates religious ma-
164. But perhaps not. "At this point in the 20th century," Justice Lewis Powell observed,
"[t]he risk.., even of deep political division along religious lines., is remote." Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
trouble with this rationale is that peace can come in many flavors, some of them quite
consistent with official religion. All that matters is that the losers know that they have no
hope of changing the status quo, and therefore no incentive to challenge it. In the litiga-
tion over religious displays, both sides have plausibly blamed civil strife on the other. The
secularists are right that the displays are the trigger for litigation, and the religious are
right that vague rules of constitutional law have encouraged litigation.
165. Raskin misunderstands our claim here in two ways. First, he imagines that our
survey would ask people whether they think there is an Establishment Clause violation. See
Raskin, supra note 14, at 771-72. A person can consistently think both (1) that a display
conveys a religious message, and (2) the Establishment Clause should be read far more
loosely that the Supreme Court has read it, so that it permits even the most overt govern-
ment endorsement of religious messages. Our survey only asks citizens for their opinions
about (1); their opinions about (2) are irrelevant. Second, he distorts our position (which
is stated clearly in the text accompanying this footnote) by asserting that we only care
about majority perceptions. Id. at 771-73.
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jorities or attempts to give the majority religion an official form. Both
majority and minority perceptions ought to count in determining
whether a display conveys a message of endorsement. If a substantial
part of either group perceives endorsement, a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause ought to be found.'6 6
On the assumption that the Establishment Clause is violated
when a message of religious support is conveyed to any group of indi-
viduals, a residency requirement is an inappropriate limitation on the
relevant population. If the presence of the display discourages visitors
from making their home in the community because they feel unwel-
come, due to a perception of endorsement, or if it encourages visitors
to move in due to the same perception, the display has had an effect
that is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
3. Sample Selection.-Probability sampling techniques, which give
each member of the relevant population a known probability of ap-
pearing in the sample, maximize both the representativeness of the
survey results and the ability to assess the accuracy of estimates ob-
tained from the survey.167 Although courts regularly accept results
from nonprobability samples in trademark cases, 168 a key question
about any sample or any method of sampling is whether some bias
occurred that was likely to produce an unrepresentative sample. In a
case alleging infringement of the trade dress in a running shoe, one
court rejected a survey conducted on spectators and participants at
running events on the ground that those who attend such events are
likely to be unusually knowledgeable about the trade dress used by
166. Professor Smith briefly considers the possibility that the endorsement test might
refer to the perceptions of a majority, but he rejects it on the following basis:
[T]o say that the perception must be that of a majority, or of some designated
group of citizens, seems unacceptable. Such a standard, besides creating addi-
tional factual questions about what a majority perceives, would offend the central
principle of Justice O'Connor's own test by establishing as definitive, and thereby
endorsing, the religious viewpoint of a majority or other designated group while
discounting the religious perspective of minorities or outsiders.
Smith, supra note 4, at 292. But the issue is not whether the majority regards the law as
unconstitutional; it is whether the majority understands the law as endorsing a religious
proposition. It is possible that the majority understands the governmental action to be
religious and supports it for that very reason. In such a case, the majority's perception of
the law as religious would weigh against its constitutionality. And, as we have noted, it is
quite possible to give weight to the majority's view without discounting that of outsiders.
167. Diamond, supra note 155, at 243.
168. See id. at 244 (noting that a large portion of consumer surveys conducted for Lan-
ham Act litigation are admitted into evidence because non-probability sampling results are
used by major companies to make crucial decisions and are used widely in marketing
research).
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companies that sell running shoes.'69 A similar problem of a biased
sample would arise in an endorsement survey if survey interviewers
selected survey participants by randomly approaching community
members who passed within twenty feet of the display-and the survey
was conducted while a protest against the display was taking place.
4. Survey Structure.-Trademark surveys can be conducted either
in person or over the telephone. Face-to-face interviewing is generally
used when the respondent must respond to some visual stimulus.
Face-to-face interviewing is thus most appropriate for the Establish-
ment Clause cases involving displays or visual symbols. Following this
format, respondents would be questioned after they viewed either the
actual display or symbol where it has been erected, or after they were
shown a realistic image of the display or symbol. In light of the poten-
tial influence of context on the message being conveyed, a simple pic-
ture, like those generally used in trademark surveys, might not be
sufficient. A reasonable alternative would be a videotape of the actual
display and its surrounding environment.
5. Choice of Questions.-To objectively assess whether consumers
are likely to be confused by a trademark or an advertisement, consum-
ers must be questioned on their perceptions using an unbiased re-
search design and non-leading questions. Courts have properly given
little or no weight to surveys in which the wording of a question sug-
gests to the respondent what the appropriate answer should be.1 70 A
standard way to begin a trademark survey assessing whether an alleg-
edly infringing trademark is conveying an inaccurate message is to
show respondents the mark and to ask the open-ended question,
"Who do you believe is sponsoring or promoting this product?" To
assess whether an advertisement is conveying a deceptive message, a
common question is "Aside from convincing you to purchase the
product being advertised, what is the main message that this advertise-
ment is trying to convey?" This question is usually followed up with a
probe ("Anything else?") that invites the respondent to identify addi-
tional messages. If such open-ended questions produce inaccurate
answers, the answers suggest that the respondent has been confused
by the mark or by the advertisement.
169. See Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75, 80 (S.D. Fla. 1981),
affd, 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983).
170. E.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1984)
(rejecting a survey in part because its main inquiry "was an obvious leading question in that
it suggested its own answer").
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Open-ended questions, such as those asking in a general way
about the message being conveyed, can underrepresent the range of
reactions that the respondent has, even with follow-up probes. A
multi-faceted stimulus can produce many reactions from the same in-
dividual and the open-ended question requires the respondent to ex-
plicitly articulate each reaction. A respondent may not exhaustively
describe her full repertoire of reactions when she must put each of
those reactions into her own words. To probe reactions more thor-
oughly, surveys frequently include follow-up questions that offer re-
spondents an opportunity to choose among possible alternatives (i.e.,
closed-ended questions). For example, the survey instrument can be
used to probe alternative messages that an allegedly deceptive adver-
tisement might be conveying. If the allegation is that the advertise-
ment suggests that the advertiser's product contains particular
ingredients while a competitor's product fails to include all of them,
the survey might show respondents a list of ingredients and ask the
consumer which of them, according to the advertisement, are con-
tained in each product. As long as the closed-ended questions in-
clude all possible alternatives as choices and are not worded in a way
that suggests right or wrong answers, the closed-ended format is useful
in that it allows respondents to easily express the full range of possible
alternatives that might represent their views. The difficulty with
closed-ended questions that provide a list of choices is that they may
suggest answers that respondents would not have considered in the
absence of the provided list of possibilities. Thus, in a survey assessing
whether a display implies religious endorsement by the state, explicitly
presenting governmental intent to advance a particular religious view
as a possible alternative on a survey instrument may in itself be leading
because it may suggest an idea that otherwise would not occur to the
respondent. Therefore, we would rely heavily on open-ended ques-
tions to elicit community reactions to an allegedly religious display,
followed by a set of direct closed-ended questions that would be evalu-
ated only against a standard of comparison provided by responses to a
set of control displays.171
The analogous survey for assessing whether a symbol or display
conveys a message of religious endorsement by the government would
require questions that address two issues: (1) whether the government
is seen as sponsoring or promoting the display, and (2) if it is, whether
171. See infra Part III.B.7 (explaining that the control display would present an unambig-
uous message of religious endorsement or nonendorsement). For a discussion of the use
of control groups in trademark surveys, see Diamond, supra note 155, at 256-60.
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that sponsorship or promotion of the display conveys a message that
the government is endorsing a particular religious view.
A first question might ask survey respondents, "What is the main
idea this display is presenting?" followed by the probe, "Anything
else?" The next question could be "Who do you believe is sponsoring
or promoting this display?" and, if the respondent answers that it is
the government, "What do you think the government's purpose is in
sponsoring or promoting this display?" A response that government is
sponsoring the display because the holiday decorations brighten up
the town square would not suggest a violation of the Establishment
Clause. A response that the government wants to show how important
Christianity is for the community would suggest unlawful
endorsement. 172
An additional open-ended question would be "How does the dis-
play make you feel?" and a follow-up question, "Why? 1 73 How the
display makes both majority and minority members of the community
feel is relevant to an assessment of the effects of the display. If com-
munity members who share the religious affiliation allegedly endorsed
in the display report that the display makes them feel that the govern-
ment supports their religion, the meaning of the display would be dif-
ferent than if those community members reported no effect on their
feelings. If they report that it makes them feel happy, and in response
to the follow-up question "Why?" say it is because it is a beautiful dis-
play, their response would provide no indication that they have per-
ceived the display as an indication of state endorsement.
This last question is particularly important, however, for minority
members of the community who may feel rejected or excluded by a
message that the state is endorsing a religious position that they do
not share. The message of endorsement to nonadherents, according
172. Raskin hypothesizes a special kind of case, which to our knowledge has never arisen
in litigation:
[suppose] a local government creates an indisputably religious display-say, Jesus
Christ on the cross below a banner stating, "He died for your sins"-and places it
in an empty park lot that had been privately owned for decades, but is now sud-
denly owned by the government because of a tax forfeiture (to almost no one's
knowledge in the general public).
Raskin, supra note 14, at 771-72. Under these circumstances, where (unlike the Pinette
case) there is no question that government is in fact sponsoring the display, the only ques-
tion that remains to be litigated is whether the display conveys a religious message, and so
one could omit from the survey any questions having to do with who is sponsoring it.
173. The questions we have suggested are tentative. Before a survey is actually carried
out, a pilot test must be conducted to determine whether the questions are clear, precise,
and unbiased-that is, whether the respondents understand the questions as they were
intended to be understood. Diamond, supra note 155, at 248-49.
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to Justice O'Connor, can be "that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community." '174 And if that is the conclusion they draw
after viewing the display, this fact suggests that the display is
unconstitutional.
Following these open-ended questions, respondents might be
asked a series of closed-ended questions that assess reactions to spe-
cific choices. The answers to these closed-ended questions would be
evaluated only against the pattern of responses to the same questions
about a set of control displays.' 7 '
After respondents to the survey are asked about their percep-
tions, the survey should include a question that allows respondents to
indicate their own religion. We have suggested that if a substantial
portion of either adherents or nonadherents perceive the display as
governmental proselytizing, the survey would provide evidence that
the Establishment Clause is being violated. Thus, it is important to
identify the subgroups within the survey sample.
6. Analysis and Reporting of Results.-In addition to analyzing and
presenting what respondents have said, survey reports generally sum-
marize the pattern of responses. It is obvious that an accurate presen-
tation of results is a crucial attribute of a good survey, but what is not
so obvious is that potentially ambiguous responses may produce differ-
ing summaries. Dispute about the analysis and interpretation of re-
sults may arise when open-ended questions are employed, because
analysts differ in their categorization of individual responses. For ex-
ample, in Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Products, Inc.,1 76 where the plain-
tiffs and defendant's experts strenuously disagreed on the number of
allegedly deceptive responses-the plaintiff arguing that forty-three
percent of the responses to the open-ended question indicated decep-
tion 177 -the court did its own analysis and identified no more than
fifteen percent that indicated deception.1 78 If a respondent says on a
survey, in response to a nativity scene, that "[T]he government is
sponsoring the display because the holiday season is a time to bring
everyone together," has the respondent indicated a perception of gov-
ernmental proselytizing? The potential for ambiguous responses
174. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
175. See infra Part 1II.B.7.
176. 538 F. Supp. 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir.
1982).
177. Id. at 1094.
178. Id. at 1096.
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highlights the value of closed-ended follow-up questions that can help
clarify the meaning of responses to the open-ended questions.
7. Using Accepted Instances of Endorsement and Nonendorsement as
Controls.-By adding a set of control displays to the survey design, it is
possible to ask respondents to choose among response alternatives in
a closed-ended format without producing an inflated or deflated esti-
mate of perceived governmental sponsorship or endorsement. If re-
spondents were shown a series of displays, including one or more that
courts agree are clear cases of endorsement and one or more that
courts agree are clear cases of nonendorsement, in addition to the
display at issue, the responses to the various displays could be used to
assess the impact of the format of the closed-ended question. If, for
example, twenty percent of respondents who were shown a series of
possible governmental purposes for a display agreed that one purpose
was to provide support for a particular religious view, these responses
might be due to the suggestion of such a possibility in the question, or
might simply be indicative of guessing, rather than providing informa-
tion that twenty percent of viewers actually saw the display as an indi-
cation of governmental endorsement. If respondents were also asked
precisely the same questions about a display that is widely accepted by
the courts as indicating no religious endorsement (e.g., a sign saying
"Welcome to Los Angeles") and twenty percent reported a perception
of state endorsement of particular religious views, that twenty percent
would properly be attributed to the effects of guessing or the particu-
lar wording of the question, and not to the allegedly infringing dis-
play. If, in contrast, the control display stimulated a lower rate of
perceived endorsement, the difference between the rates for the dis-
play at issue and the control group could be used to determine
whether perceptions of endorsement exceeded some acceptable
minimum.
8. The Potential for Strategic Behavior.-In a carefully executed
survey, respondents cannot ascertain what responses are expected or
preferred by the sponsor of the research. In a community in which
there is controversy over a display that allegedly conveys a message of
governmental endorsement of religion, some members of the com-
munity may be familiar with the issues involved in the dispute. To
assess whether familiarity with the dispute is associated with a distinc-
tive set of responses to the survey, respondents should be asked at the
end of the interview whether they are familiar with, and how much
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they know about, the controversy. 179 To the extent that respondents
who are familiar and unfamiliar with the issues respond differently,
greater weight should be given to the responses of those unfamiliar
with the controversy, because their responses are less likely to be the
product of strategic behavior.
9. How Many People Must Give a Response That Signals Confusion or
a Perception of Endorsement ?-In trademark law, there is no single re-
sponse percentage threshold for a finding of likelihood of confusion,
although courts have on some occasions found survey percentages to
be too low to warrant a finding that confusion was likely. When a
survey indicated that only 7.6% of respondents believed that
"YOGOWHIP" came from the same company as "MIRACLE WHIP,"
the court held that consumer confusion was not likely. 8 ' The court
noted that a ten percent level had been deemed sufficient in an ear-
lier case,"' while a nine percent level had been characterized in an-
other case as a "'questionable amount of confusion.'"' 82  In
evaluating the level of confusion reflected in the results of a survey, it
is important to consider the questions that the respondents have been
asked. If ten percent of respondents say that the company responsible
for The Sign of the Beefeater restaurant also produces gin, particu-
larly when the restaurant sign they are shown indicates that the restau-
rant does not serve liquor, that ten percent is more substantial than if
respondents were asked whether the company responsible for the res-
taurant did or did not produce gin. It would be far less likely that a
consumer would guess "gin" in the absence of confusion in response
to the first question, and highly likely that some of the agreements in
response to the second question would represent mere guesses.' 18
Justice O'Connor is quite correct that the idiosyncratic views of a
few people cannot be enough to sustain a finding of impermissible
endorsement. 84 As critics of the endorsement test have noted, some
political alienation is inevitable no matter what the government does.
179. This is why Raskin's proposal that we consider "an actual election" as a substitute for
polling reveals a complete misunderstanding of our argument. Raskin, supra note 14, at
774.
180. Henri's Food Prods. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 358 (7th Cir. 1983).
181. Id. (citing James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 572 F.2d 574, 578
(7th Cir. 1978)).
182. Id (quoting Wuv's Int'l, Inc. v. Love's Enters., Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. 736, 756 (D. Colo.
1980)).
183. For a description of the use of control groups to assess the effects of guessing, see
Diamond, supra note 155, at 256-60.
184. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Some de minimis threshold sufficient to exclude such unusual views is
indispensable, and here, as in trademark law, there is no principle
from which we can deduce what percentage is too low to count. It is
enough here to note that courts have drawn such lines in the trade-
mark context and that there is no reason to think that they cannot
draw similar lines in Establishment Clause cases.' 8 5 We can suggest an
arbitrary threshold-ten percent, for example-but there is no reason
why it could not be higher or lower."8 6
185. Neal Feigenson, who suggests defamation law as a model, has argued that similar
lines have been drawn there:
Defamation law is most useful in providing the standard for determining the mes-
sage's meaning. In defamation law, as opposed to the law of obscenity, for in-
stance, "community standards" or the "average observer" do not necessarily rule.
In a defamation case, "liability is not a question of majority vote." Rather, "[iut is
enough that the communication would tend to prejudice [its object] in the eyes
of a substantial and respectable minority" of the community. While defamation is
not "a question of the existence of some individual or individuals with views suffi-
ciently peculiar to regard as derogatory what the vast majority of persons regard
as innocent," neither does it depend on the views of "right-thinking people." In-
deed, "if the plaintiff's reputation is injured in the eyes of a segment of the com-
munity whose views cannot be said to be totally irrational or lawless, the courts
should give redress against the injury."
Feigenson, supra note 64, at 96-97 (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting
Peck v. Chi. Tribune, 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909); 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 5.1, at 25 (2d ed. 1986); Note, Defamation-Imputation of Sympathy with Commu-
nism, 7 ALA. LAW 347, 349 (1946)). Feigenson, however, suggests that one plaintiffs per-
ception of endorsement, along with a cogent supporting explanation, is enough to shift
the burden ofjustification to the State. Id. at 101. Joel Jacobs, however, worries that Fei-
genson's test "relies heavily on the reactions of individuals who may be hyper-sensitive
and/or ingenuine." Jacobs, supra note 147, at 40. A de minimis exception needs to be
more robust than this.
186. Raskin criticizes us for failing to "commit [our]selves to a particular percentage
threshold at which the perception of endorsement becomes a binding force on the judicial
determination of an Establishment Clause violation." Raskin, supra note 14, at 773. If it
would be helpful for a court (including, perhaps, the Supreme Court) to set a legal thresh-
old, then the court ought to do that. But our analysis does not entail any particular num-
ber, and we are not persuaded that our argument would be strengthened or even clarified
if we picked some number and then insisted on it. Because we think minority perceptions
matter, and because a religious minority might be smaller than any given percentage
threshold, such an insistence would be misleading. To say this is not to say that "no partic-
ular percentage of the polled public is required to find religious endorsement in order to
strike it down." Id.
Our response to Judge Easterbrook's concerns, quoted in the epigraph at the begin-
ning of this Article, should at this point be clear. Judge Easterbrook provides a distorted
view both of modern trademark evidence and of the way that evidence assessing the per-
ceptions of the community would emerge in litigation under the Establishment Clause if
the modern approach to trademark litigation were to be applied. Judge Easterbrook's
hypothetical expert would be offering to testify about whether viewers are likely to perceive
one display the way they view another. Courts, at least in the wake of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997);
and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), require federal judges ruling on the
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Some government acts are unlikely to be particularly ambiguous.
Religious symbols that have been drained of meaning for the entire
population, such as the names of cities like Los Angeles and San Fran-
cisco, are likely to prove acceptable."8 7 On the other hand, an en-
dorsement test that relies on empirical evidence may well condemn
some government conduct that seems natural and familiar to many
people. We await the evidence, of course, but we would not be sur-
prised if a creche erected by a city conveyed a message of endorse-
ment to the overwhelming majority of both Christian and non-
Christian citizens.
This may be why Justice O'Connor hesitates. Holiday displays are
so familiar that they may seem natural, and justice O'Connor may sim-
ply not want to adopt a test that will have the effect of prohibiting
them. If one believes that such displays must be permissible as a mat-
ter of law, however, then it would be better to say this and to say that
perceptions of endorsement are legally irrelevant, rather than to de-
clare that those who perceive endorsement of religion are unreasona-
ble or unfair.1 88
admissibility of the expert testimony to evaluate the methods used by prospective experts
to arrive at their opinions. A federal court should expect experts offering such testimony
to offer some basis-for example, a survey-on which to claim that the two hypothetical
displays would be perceived similarly. Offering an opinion grounded in mere "ipse dixit" of
the expert, Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146, should not suffice. The alternative form of evidence
suggested by Judge Easterbrook-a few witnesses testifying about their reactions to the
display-would also meet with judicial skepticism. Although early trademark cases in pre-
survey times did rely on the testimony of consumer witnesses who reported that they were
or were not confused; see Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 87 F. Supp. 16, 17 (N.D.
I11. 1959) (noting that seventy-five or eighty witnesses testified that they had accidentally
picked up a package of the defendant's candy); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co.,
26 F.2d 376, 377 (D. Del. 1928) (discussing the argument that a plaintiff ought to be pre-
pared with twenty to thirty witnesses (quotingJ. CUTLER, ON PASSING OFF 43 (1904)); these
consumer witnesses have largely been supplanted by survey evidence in modern trademark
litigation. The obvious opportunities to select and present witnesses who are unrepresent-
ative or who testify strategically reduces the credibility of such testimony as a way to assess
general reactions in the relevant population.
187. We note, however, that trademark law faces and deals with an analogous situation
when meanings change over time. "Thermos" and "aspirin" are two examples of initially
valid trademarks that lost their trademark status when usage of a term that originally sig-
naled a single producer came to be understood as a general product category. See King-
Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) ("thermos" for
vacuum bottle); Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) ("aspirin"
for acetyl salicylic acid). If a town decided to change its name today to Saint Francis, the
community perceptions of the message conveyed by the new name might well indicate a
violation of the Establishment Clause. In contrast, we would not expect the name San
Francisco, for the city by the Bay, to evoke such a response.
188. There are cases in which perceptions of endorsement must be irrelevant as a mat-
ter of law. Some government acts are deemed per se permissible under the Establishment
Clause. For example, legislatures are permitted to exempt conscientious objectors from
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
On the other hand,Justice O'Connor has been operating in igno-
rance. Neither she nor anyone else knows for certain how much polit-
ical alienation and how much degradation of the majority's religiosity
are the price that is being paid for the creche. Perhaps it is worth it.
But until the cost is accurately measured, there is no way to say so with
any confidence? 89
IV. ANOTHER APPLICATION: OPERATIONALIZING EQUALITY
The reliance on survey data that we have suggested here may be
useful in other areas of constitutional law as well. The message con-
veyed by government action is not only pertinent in the context of
religion.
Consider the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of racial dis-
crimination. Today's doctrine of Equal Protection is a disaster area.
All that is prohibited in practice is legislation that classifies on the
basis of race, which means in contemporary America that the Amend-
ment designed to protect the freed slaves and their descendants func-
tions today to attack affirmative action programs and thus to vindicate
the rights of white people. Racism is not dead, of course, and there is
still state action that does not classify on the basis of race, but is moti-
vated by disdain for blacks. But current doctrine requires that any
challenge to such action prove that the action was taken "'because of,'
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group."'9 ° Not only is conscious malice almost impossible to prove,
but malice describes only part of the problem. Paul Brest has ob-
generally applicable laws. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1994) (providing an exemption
from military service for "any person ... who, by reason of religious training and belief, is
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form"). Perhaps the oldest such law
is the exemption of Quakers from the military draft. See id.; United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965) (discussing and applying the conscientious objection standard). Someone
might regard that law as an endorsement of the Quaker religion, but the exemption would
be constitutionally permissible even if a majority of the population so perceived it. Other
government acts are deemed per se forbidden. Government may not pay the salaries of
priests, or create a tax deduction for Christians, and a person attacking these practices
need not, and should not be required to, rely on survey evidence. But most government
actions, such as the erecting of symbols on public property, are neither licensed nor forbid-
den by settled Establishment Clause doctrine. Within that very large field, survey evidence
has a useful role to play in litigation.
189. It is also arguable that present Establishment Clause law is simply incoherent-an
unprincipled amalgam of secular individualism and religious communitarianism. See gener-
ally FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (1995). Here we will simply record our view that the
endorsement of religion that communitarianism would permit cannot be given a princi-
pled justification with the materials currently available to legal discourse.
190. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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served that government's obligation to avoid prejudiced decisionmak-
ing is equally violated by decisions that reflect "racially selective
sympathy and indifference," meaning "the unconscious failure to ex-
tend to a minority the same recognition of humanity, and hence the
same sympathy and care, given as a matter of course to one's own
group."
9 1
Charles Lawrence has suggested that the best response to the
problem of unconscious prejudice is one that builds on Charles
Black's suggestion that the constitutionality of racial segregation
should turn on "what segregation means to the people who impose it
and to the people who are subjected to it."19 2 Lawrence proposes that
cultural meaning should be the basis for determining whether a gov-
ernment action is racially discriminatory and thus subject to strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.1 1 3 If an action has a racially charged meaning, he argues, it is
reasonable to presume that that meaning is shared by the deci-
sionmaker1 4 Cultural meaning thus provides a window into uncon-
scious motivation.
This test would evaluate governmental conduct to see if it
conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches ra-
cial significance. The court would analyze governmental be-
havior much like a cultural anthropologist might: by
considering evidence regarding the historical and social con-
text in which the decision was made and effectuated. If the
court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that a
significant portion of the population thinks of the govern-
mental action in racial terms, then it would presume that so-
cially shared, unconscious racial attitudes made evident by
the action's meaning had influenced the decisionmakers. As
a result, it would apply heightened scrutiny.' 95
Thus, for example, the social meaning of the segregation that was
at issue in Brown v. Board of Education19 6 was obvious. "Given this com-
mon knowledge, it is difficult, if not impossible, to envision how a
governmental decision-maker might issue an order to segregate with-
out intending, consciously or unconsciously, to injure blacks." 97
191. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimina-
tion Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1976).
192. Black, supra note 115, at 426.
193. Lawrence, supra note 114, at 355-56.
194. Id. at 356.
195. Id.
196. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
197. Lawrence, supra note 114, at 363.
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Lawrence claims that his test produces a similar result in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 98 one of the
cases in which the Supreme Court announced that the Constitution
prohibited only intentional discrimination. The case involved a
nearly all-white suburban village's refusal to permit the construction
of an integrated low-income housing project. 99 The Court con-
cluded that the exclusion of blacks by the village's refusal to rezone
for low-income housing was not per se unconstitutional, and that the
black plaintiffs had "simply failed to carry their burden of proving that
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's deci-
sion. '"200 Lawrence argues, on the contrary, that segregated housing
itself carries a message of inferiority, and that race was a prominent
theme on both sides of the debate over whether to permit the pro-
ject.201 Moreover, the maintenance of an all-white suburb itself is in-
terpreted in our culture "as evidence of blacks' continued
untouchability. 120 2
He offers a similar analysis of City of Memphis v. Greene,203 in which
the Court upheld a city's decision to construct a wall cutting off traffic
between black and white neighborhoods.20 4
Individual members of the city council might well have been
unaware that their continuing need to maintain their superi-
ority over blacks, or their failure to empathize with how con-
struction of the wall would make blacks feel, influenced their
decision. But if one were to ask even the most self-deluded
among them what the residents of Memphis would take the
existence of the wall to mean, the obvious answer would be
difficult to avoid.20 5
It is not clear how Lawrence deals with differences in the percep-
tions of different parts of the community-or, for that matter, differ-
ences between his perceptions and those of the Court. He does not
explain how the Court is to decide what a significant portion of the
population thinks, or what proportion counts as "significant." The
plurality of perceptions matters as much here as it does in the Estab-
lishment Clause context.
198. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
199. Id. at 254-55.
200. Id. at 270.
201. Lawrence, supra note 114, at 366-67.
202. Id. at 369.
203. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
204. Id. at 128-29.
205. Lawrence, supra note 114, at 357-58 (footnotes omitted).
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MEASURED ENDORSEMENT
In Equal Protection, just as in Establishment, there are distinct
policies that point to different relevant populations. Process-based
theories suggest that the perceptions that matter are those of the deci-
sionmakers, who are obligated not to make racially biased policies;
result-based theories are, on the contrary, concerned about the politi-
cal alienation of minorities. 20 6 For present purposes, we need not
choose between these approaches. It is enough to note that they ex-
haust the set of alternatives on offer in the literature, and that both of
them entail the relevance of survey evidence of a kind that the Court
has never considered in this context. The weakness of the Court's
approach is revealed by the fact that it relies solely on the judges' own
perceptions of the meaning of the government action. It is possible
that everyone in Arlington Heights, blacks and whites alike, agreed
that the exclusion of the housing project had a racist meaning. It is
possible that everyone in Memphis, blacks and whites alike, agreed
that the traffic barrier had a racist meaning. In both cases, the dim
perception ofjudges in distant Washington, D.C., turned out to be the
only perception that mattered.
In Plessy v. Ferg-uson,2 °7 Justice Harlan tried to respond to the
Court's obliviousness by pointing to what "[e]very one knows."2 8 His
problem was that he had no way to prove what he thought that every-
one knew. It is, however, possible to compile such evidence, and such
evidence can be helpful, particularly in the face of oblivious judges. It
shouldn't matter whether judges are perceptive about social meaning.
Their perceptions are not at issue, and the perceptions that are at
issue can be measured and presented to the court.
The measurement of social meaning is thus relevant to Four-
teenth Amendment adjudication. It is, however, less pertinent than it
is in cases involving the Establishment Clause. Fourteenth Amend-
ment cases rarely involve purely symbolic actions such as erecting
creches. Rather, they involve actions-zoning decisions, traffic rules,
regulations of railroads-that aim at tangible results in the world. It is
possible that an action that has a racial meaning could still be justifia-
ble. The commitment to eradicating racism cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to override every other commitment that our society has.
Heightened, but not invariably fatal,judicial scrutiny seems to be what
is called for in these cases.20 ' In the typical Establishment Clause case,
206. For a discussion of process-based theories and result-based theories, see generally
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 13-114 (1996).
207. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
208. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
209. See KoPPELMAN, supra note 206, at 103-11.
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on the other hand, when all that government is doing is disseminating
a meaning, a finding of prohibited cultural meaning should usually
end the case.
CONCLUSION
Both the Equal Protection Clause and the Establishment Clause
are concerned with preventing oppression of minorities. In both
cases, the oppression resides centrally in the production of social
meaning-of the official meaning of race or religion. Courts have
understood that social meaning matters in constitutional law. That
proposition seems undeniable. "Social inequality is substantially cre-
ated and enforced-that is, done-through words and images. Social
hierarchy cannot and does not exist without being embodied in mean-
ings and expressed in communications."210  But courts have not
known where to go from there. They have not recognized that social
meaning is measurable or that an assessment need not be based on
mere speculation. The missing method can be found in trademark
law-an area that is hardly obscure, but with which constitutional
scholars tend to be unfamiliar. 21'
In his famous 1789 pamphlet, What Is the Third Estate?,212 the
Abbe Sieyes noted that the Third Estate in France-that vast majority
of the population that was neither the nobility nor the clergy-that
was legally nothing, was in fact everything, and was demanding, politi-
cally, to become something. 213 Our suggestion about the actual per-
ceptions of symbolic government action endorsing religion,
measurable by survey evidence, is similar. The cultural meaning of
symbolic action, as perceived by the population at large, is everything.
Legally, it is nothing. Our suggestion is that it become something.
210. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, ONLY WORDS 13 (1993).
211. Professor Koppelman, for example, was profoundly ignorant of this field until Pro-
fessor Diamond pointed out its relevance to the Establishment Clause issues that Koppel-
man was studying. For this reason, the authors are in disagreement about the significance
of the order of names at the beginning of this Article. Koppelman thinks that it reflects
the fact that the idea for the Article is really Diamond's. Diamond, who until Koppelman's
faculty workshop on secular purpose had not focused at all on constitutional issues involv-
ing religion, is adamant that the names are merely in alphabetical order.
212. EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, WHAT IS THE THIRD ESTATE? (M. Blondel trans., S. E.
Finer ed., 1963) (1798).
213. Id. at 51-52.
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